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PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
DAVID AKERSON* AND NATALIE KNOWLTON**
I. INTRODUCTION
The last fifteen years have seen the dramatic expansion of international
criminal law and the use of international criminal tribunals to prosecute senior
leaders for their role in war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide
(international criminal law or ICL). An important development at the tribunals has
been the law of command responsibility.' While its history can be traced as far
back as 500 B.C., the modern doctrine draws from the jurisprudence that emerged
from the military tribunals established after World War II - the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) that tried Nazi Germany's war criminals and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) that prosecuted Japanese
officials.
Decades later, in the early 1990s, scenes of concentration camps eerily
reminiscent of the Nazi Holocaust began to come out of the former Yugoslavia.
The outrage over those images spurred the United Nations Security Council in
1993 to utilize its broad Chapter VII powers2 in a novel way - with the creation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Within a
year, that decision spawned the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). Thus began the inexorable trend toward the deployment of
tribunals as a tool in post-conflict resolution. By 2008, there were seven
international or quasi-international tribunals, including the ICTY and ICTR, The
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Lebanon Tribunal), The
Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor (East Timor Tribunal) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). These institutions (collectively The Tribunals) are focused on and
mandated to indict high-level political and military leaders who orchestrate
* Visiting Scholar, University of Denver Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Adjunct
Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
** J.D./M.A. 2008, University of Denver Sturm College of Law and Josef Korbel School of
International Studies.
1. Command responsibility is also referred to as "superior responsibility," a term that denotes the
application of command responsibility to a broader civilian context. For the purposes of this article it
will be referred to as command responsibility.
2. See U.N. Charter ch. 7 (addressing Action with Respect to the Threats of Peace, Breaches of
Peace, and Acts of Aggression).
3. Julia Preston, U.N. Moves to Create Balkan War Crimes Panel, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1993, at
A24.
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atrocities. To date, the Tribunals' indictments include Yugoslavian President
Slobodan Milogevi6, Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, two Presidents of
the self-declared Republic of Srpska Radovan Karadzic and Biljana Plavsic,
Liberian President Charles Taylor and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.
The Tribunals exercise jurisdiction over three categories of core international
crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
4  The direct
perpetrators of these crimes are typically lower-ranking subordinated field soldiers,
militia or paramilitary members. One of the significant challenges of the tribunals
is to link crimes committed by subordinates to the military or political superiors.
To this end, the tribunals have two alternatives. The first alternative is to charge
commanders with "individual criminal liability" for their direct involvement in the
crimes, such as ordering, instigating or planning.5  The second alternative,
command or superior responsibility, is an indirect form of responsibility based on
an omission: the commander's failure to fulfill a duty with regard to subordinates
to prevent crimes where possible, or to punish the commission of offenses after the
fact.6
While the doctrine of command responsibility is firmly entrenched in ICL,
new issues have arisen in the doctrine's application. In 2001, the ICTY indicted
Bosnian military officers Enver Had~ihasanovid, Mehmed Alagic and Amir
Kabura (the Accused) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity based
on a command responsibility theory for failing to punish his subordinates who had
committed those crimes.7 These charges were contentious because for certain acts
Kabura was not the subordinates' commander at the time of the commission of the
crime, rather he had assumed command after the fact. For the purposes of this
article, we refer to this form of command responsibility as successor liability.
Before trial, the Accused moved to strike successor liability in the indictment. 8
The Trial Chamber rejected their argument, but on interlocutory appeal the
Appeals Chamber reversed the lower court and invalidated successor liability.
9
4. In the case of the quasi-international tribunals, such as the SCSL and the ECCC, they include
domestic crimes as well. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Statute of the SCSL]; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea art. 3, NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004 [hereinafter ECCC Statute].
5. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Annex 1, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, Annex 1, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (July 1,
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
6. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at art. 6(3).
7. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Indictment, 18 (July
13, 2001). The ICTY amended this initial indictment two times. See also discussion infra Part I1.B. 1.
8. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 1 (Nov. 12, 2002).
9. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on




The Appeal Chamber decision issued its decision in the form of a three-two
majority opinion with two strong dissents.
10
At the time the ICTY was litigating successor liability in Hadiihasanovi6,
President George W. Bush, was commander-in-chief of U.S. armed forces, and had
implemented controversial policies of water-boarding, harsh interrogation and
indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay. These policies were widely-publicized
and openly acknowledged by the Bush administration.11 The implementation of
these policies involved the issuing of orders at a command level and the execution
of orders by subordinates. On January 20, 2009, President Barack Obama
succeeded President Bush as commander-in-chief and inherited authority over
many subordinates who are alleged to have participated in the execution of these
policies. Successor liability would mandate that Obama has a duty to punish
known subordinate offenders, and a failure to do so would subject him to liability.
As international law becomes more comfortable holding senior leaders liable
for mass crimes, it will be confronted on reoccurring basis with the criminal
subordinates who remain in their positions in successive regimes. Do the new
regime leaders, such as Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United
Kingdom, each of who may have had no involvement in the crimes or opposed the
criminal policies of their predecessors (hereinafter referred to as successor
regimes), have a duty to root out and punish subordinate offenders to the extent
that a failure to discharge that duty subjects them to criminal liability for acts they
may have opposed?
This article examines the law and policies of successor liability in light of
President Obama and clamor for him to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Bush
administration. Section II will analyze the branch of successor liability as it
currently stands in international law. Section III will then view successor liability
with respect to President Obama and his role as a commander of subordinates in
the armed forces who may have committed crimes. The section will first set forth
the alleged crimes committed under the prior Presidential administration and then
discusses President Obama's duty to respond to those crimes. Various policy
arguments militating for and against establishing successor liability are explored in
Section IV.
II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY BRANCH
A. Codification
The body of case law that came out of the World War II tribunals established
and developed command responsibility as a form of individual criminal
responsibility; however, the operating statutes of the IMT and IMTFE did not
expressly provide for command responsibility. Likewise, the four Geneva
Conventions are largely silent on the issue. 12 The first codification of the doctrine
10. Id. 57.
11. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
12. See Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 39, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
2009
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in international humanitarian law is in Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I
to the Geneva Convention of 1977 - applicable to international armed conflicts -
which establishes superior liability for failures to act and places a duty on
commanders to prevent, suppress or punish breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
13
Since then, the doctrine of command responsibility as a form of individual
criminal liability has been expressly recognized by all of the international
tribunals. It is set forth in Articles 6(3) and 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTR and
ICTY, respectively, Article 6 of the Statute of the SCSL, Section 16 of the
constitutive document of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes, and in Article 29
of the ECCC. 14 All of these tribunals generally reference command responsibility
as follows:
15
The fact that any of the acts referred to in the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish
the perpetrators thereof. 16
While the expression of the command responsibility doctrine may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the ad hoc jurisdictions, beginning with the Celebii
Trial Chamber, have generally recognized three elements necessary to a finding of
superior liability: the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; the
commander's knowledge of the subordinate's crime; and the commander's failure
to act either in the form of preventing the criminal acts or if learned of after the
fact, punishing the offenders.1 7 Successor liability is concerned with this latter
duty to punish, in the case of a new commander who inherits subordinates who
have previously committed criminal acts under a previous commander.
B. Successor Liability
1. Current State of the Law
The successor liability branch of command responsibility has to date been
litigated only at the ICTY. It was first discussed in the case of Prosecutor v.
Kordi6 and Cerkez.18 Dario Kordi6 was a high-ranking political figure in the
Bosnian Croat separatist movement who exercised substantial influence over its
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention lI].
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
14. ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at art. 6(3); ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(3); Statute of the
SCSL, supra note 4, at art. 6; U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Regulation on the Establishment
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, § 16, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Statute of East Timor Tribunal]; ECCC Statute,
supra note 4, at art. 29.
15. With slight variations.
16. ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(3).
17. Prosecutor v. Delalik, Muci6, Deli6 & Landfo, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, [ 346 (Nov. 16,
1998). The three elements of command responsibility are discussed in more detail in Section III (B),
infra.
18. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & C(erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Feb. 26, 2001).
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military and paramilitary operations. 19 Mario Cerkez was the commander of a
Bosnian Croat Brigade.2 °  While the issue of successor liability was not
specifically challenged at the pre-trial stage, the Trial Chamber in convicting the
two Accused did address the issue. In obiter dicta, the Trial Chamber affirmed
that
The duty to punish naturally arises after a crime has been committed.
Persons who assume command after the commission are under the same
duty to punish. This duty includes at least an obligation to investigate
the crimes to establish the facts and to report them to the competent
authorities, if the superior does not have the power to sanction himself.
Civilian superiors would be under similar obligations.
21
The issue of successor liability next came up in the ICTY case of Prosecutor
v. Hadiihasanovi6 and Kabura.22 Enver Had~ihasanovi6 and Amir Kabura were
professional military officers in the Yugoslavian army of the SFRY prior to its
dissolution. When Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence,
Had~ihasanovi6 and Kabura migrated from the Yugoslavian Army to the newly-
formed Army of the Republic of Bosian-Herzegovina (ABiH). Both served as
high-ranking officers in the Army of Bosnian-Herzegovina during the ensuing
23armed conflicts. In several indictments, the ICTY alleged that the ABiH
committed a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hadhihasanovi6
was initially a Commander of the ABiH 3rd Corps, then later promoted to the Chief
of the Supreme Command.24 Kabura was initially commissioned as the Deputy
Commander of a detachment in the Bosnian city of Kakanj2 He rose steadily
through the ranks of the ABiH, becoming the 3rd Corps 7 th Muslim Mountain
Brigade Chief of Staff on January 1, 1993.26 Between April and July of that year,
Kabura effectively served as Commander of the Mountain Brigade, as its de jure
Commander Asim Koricic was absent. The ICTY indicted Hadhihasanovi6 and
Kabura in a joint amended indictment on September 26, 2003.27 The indictment
alleged that 3 rd Corps committed a range of war crimes, including attacking
civilians causing death and serious injury, unlawful imprisonment of Croatian and
19. See Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Amended Indictment, 9-10 (Sept.
30, 1998).
20. See id 12.
21. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & (erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 1 446 (Feb. 26, 2001)
(citation omitted).
22. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Indictment (July 13,
2001). Alagi6 died before trial commenced and the action against him was terminated by the Trial
Chamber on March 21, 2003. An amended indictment without Alagi6 was issued on September 26,
2003. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Third Amended Indictment
(Sept. 26, 2003).
23. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended




27. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Third Amended Indictment
(Sept. 26, 2003).
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Serbians who were subjected to physical and psychological abuse, inhumane
treatment, and deprivations of basic necessities. 28 The indictment charged Kabura
with criminal responsibility for acts committed by his subordinates, the 3 rd Corps,
based on the command responsibility provision of the ICTY statute.29  The
indictment indicated that liability would attach to Kabura if the superior knew or
had reason to know" of acts his subordinates were about to commit "or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to ...
punish the perpetrators thereof.,30  The indictment charged that Kabura had
assumed command over the Mountain Brigade in the midst of a military campaign
in which war crimes and crimes against humanity were alleged to have already
been committed. 31 The indictment included the allegation that Kabura was
responsible for subordinates who had committed crimes two months before his
assumption of command.32 Thus, for the first time in international criminal law an
indictment had explicitly charged an accused with successor liability.
The Accused challenged the successor liability aspects of the indictment in a
pre-trial motion.33 The Accused argued that "Article 7(3) may apply when the
superior learns after the event of the offence, but that the superior-subordinate
relationship must [also have existed] at the time of the offence., 34 The Defense
argument was comprised of both legal and policy components. The legal argument
turned on the notion that command responsibility required a commander to have
effective control of his subordinates at the time of the commission of the acts and
thus be in a position to prevent the breach. 3 Kabura argued that he did not have
effective control of subordinates during their commission because he was not yet
their commander, and thus he was not liable under command responsibility. In
support of this position, the Accused relied on language from the ICTY case of
Prosecutor v. Delali and Deli. The Delali6 and Deli6 case (sometimes referred
to as the Celebi&i case) trial judgment stated in a general discussion of command
responsibility that a commander must have effective control over subordinates for
command responsibility to attach.36 The Defense extracted this argument and put
it forward as support for their position. They then buttressed that assertion with
the policy argument that the "aim of command responsibility [is] to ensure that
commanders will guarantee that troops over whom they have effective control will
28. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended
Indictment, 41-42 (Jan. 11, 2002).
29. Id. 13 (citing ICTY Statute Article 7(3)).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See id. 58.
32. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT,
Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 180 (Nov. 12, 2002).
33. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovid, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction (Nov. 12, 2002).
34. Id. 185 (citing the written submissions of Hadzihasanovi).
35. See id.
36. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucid, Delic & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 378 (Nov. 16,
1998) (citing the International Law Commission Draft Code).
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conduct operations in accordance with the law, thereby preventing crimes from
being committed.
3 7
The Prosecution responded that the operative fact is who the commander was
with effective control over subordinates when knowledge of the past commissions
of criminal acts is attained. 38 The Prosecution also asserted that the Accused's
position would create a lacuna in the law, effectively allowing militaries to swap
commanders when breaches were committed thus eliminating the new
commander's duty to punish.3 9
The three-judge Trial Chamber sided with the Prosecution and denied the
Defense's motion. The Chamber found that "in principle a commander could be
liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for crimes committed prior to
the moment that the commander assumed command.,
40
They reasoned that the purpose of the doctrine of command responsibility was
"to require commanders to fulfill their duty to ensure that their subordinates
comply with the principles of international humanitarian law' 41 and successor
liability helped satisfy that purpose of command responsibility by pressuring
subsequent commanders to investigate allegations.42
The Defense filed an interlocutory appeal on November 27, 2002 challenging
the Trial Chamber's decision.4 3 On appeal the Accused again argued that "the
express terms" of Article 7(3) of the [ICTY] Statute precluded successor liability
in that it required a superior-subordinate relationship at the time of the commission
of the offense. 44 "The proper person," the Defense offered, "to be prosecuted is the
commander who had effective control . . . at the time the offences were
committed., 45 The Accused also asserted that there was no basis in conventional
or customary law for successor liability. 46 And finally, the Accused argued that by
affirming successor liability, the Appeals Chamber would undesirably extend
liability for years after the offenses were committed.4 7
The Prosecution relied on the obiter in the Kordi6 Trial Judgment, discussed
supra. But it also conceded the paucity of precedent, arguing that "the lack of a
known precedent for a finding of guilt for failing to punish subordinates for
37. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 185 (Nov. 12, 2002) (emphasis omitted).
38. Id. 191.
39. See id 192-94.
40. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 7 202 (Nov. 12, 2002).
41. Id. 197.
42. Id. 200.
43. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Interlocutory Appeal
on Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 77 12, 120-23 (Nov. 27, 2002).
44. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
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offences committed before assuming command cannot prevent charging an
accused in this manner. "48 In effect, the prosecution was arguing that the issue of a
successor commander was not new law but rather an unforeseen factual
circumstance that the Appeals Chamber could decide fell within the scopes of
command responsibility.
The five-judge Appeals Chamber issued its three-two decision on the appeal
on July 16, 2003.49 The three judge majority overruled the Trial Chamber's
decision (as well as the obiter in the earlier Kordi6 and Cerkez trial judgments)
50
while Judges Hunt and Shahabadeen dissented.
The majority opinion offered that
[i]n considering the issue of whether command responsibility exists in
relation to crimes committed by a subordinate prior to an accused's
assumption of command over that subordinate, the Appeals Chamber
observes that it has always been the approach of this Tribunal not to
rely merely on a construction of the Statute to establish the applicable
law on criminal responsibility, but to ascertain the state of customary
law in force at the time the crimes were committed.51
In analyzing customary international law as it stood at the time of the
commission of the crimes, the majority found that
[i]n this particular case, no practice can be found, nor is there any
evidence of opinio juris that would sustain the proposition that a
commander can be held responsible for crimes committed by a
subordinate prior to the commander's assumption of command over that
subordinate.52
The majority did conclude that what precedent existed militated against
successor liability. Two primary sources that it relied on were a definition of
command responsibility as set forth in the Rome Statute's Article 28, and Article
86 of the 1977 Additional Protocols I, both of which will be discussed infra.
While a three-two Appeal Chamber decision is binding authority on the Trial
Chambers at the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, even Judge Meron (one of the
majority judges) acknowledged that the narrowness of a three-two majority "and




50. Gideon Boas et al., Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law 233 (2007).
51. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 44 (July 16,
2003).
52. Id. 45.
53. THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 89 (1998) (referring to the Erdemovic
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ruling "that duress does not afford a complete defense to a solider charged
with a crime against humanity and/or ... killing of innocent human beings.").
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Both dissenting judges seized on the argument of the majority that it was
required that successor liability be part of customary international law in order.
Judge Shahabuddeen in his dissent acknowledged that there were no clear
authorities one way or the other on the successor liability issue.54 But in such a
circumstance, he offered, the Tribunal has the competence to interpret established
principles of law (such as superior responsibility) and to determine whether a
particular situation falls within the principle.55 He argued that this wasn't creating
law, but rather interpreting and applying one of its existing principles; a proper
function of Judges.
56
In his dissent, Judge Hunt similarly submitted that the proper analysis of
successor liability is not whether it "clearly" existed as custom at the time of the
commission of the crimes, but whether successor liability is a new situation that
reasonably falls within the principle of command responsibility. 7  Judge Hunt
pointed out the paradox of the majority's position, that
[s]urely it is the purpose of the relevant principle of customary
international law which dictates the scope of its application, not the
facts of the situation to which the principle is sought to be applied.
And, if that scope or purpose is not sufficiently rigorous or precise, it
may be defined by reference to the 'principles of humanity' and
'dictates of the public conscience' as provided for in the Martens
Clause. If the view of the majority is correct, no principle of customary
international law could ever be applied to a new situation, simply
because it is a new situation.
5 8
Judge Hunt also pointed out the irony in the reasoning of the majority itself on
a different issue in the appeal. Here, the majority found that where it can be shown
a principle exists "it is not an objection to the application of the principle to a
particular situation to say that ... it reasonably falls within the application of the
principle.,
59
Other tribunal decisions have examined "new" situations and validated them
as situations reasonably falling within the established custom. In Prosecutor v.
Karamera, an ICTR Appeals Chambers held that the imposition of liability for
participation in enterprises that are not limited in size or scope is a new situation
that reasonably fell within the broader parameters of Joint Criminal Enterprise - a
principle with a clear basis in customary international law.60 The Brdanin Trial
Chamber approved an unprecedented aspect of superior responsibility when it
54. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 8 (July 16,
2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
55. Id. 9.
56. See id. 9-10.
57. See id. 38 (Hunt, J. dissenting) (separate and partially dissenting opinion).
58. Id. 40 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. 37 (citing the majority opinion) (emphasis omitted).
60. Karamera et al, Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision, (ICTR) paras. 15-16.
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satisfied itself that the principle reasonably fell within the application of the
general doctrine of superior criminal responsibility.
6 1
The Hadihasanovi6 majority position was criticized in subsequent judgments
although followed on the grounds of stare decisis. The Trial Chamber in
Hadiihasanovi6, after the case had been remanded to them after the interlocutory
appeal, lamented in its judgment that the Appeals Chambers had in fact created gap
in the law:
Since the commanders of troops change on a regular basis in times of
war, there is a serious risk that a gap in the line of responsibilities will
be created as the changes occur. . . [1]f the superior in command at the
time a crime is committed is replaced very soon after its commission, it
is very likely that the perpetrators of that crime will go unpunished and
that no commander will be held criminally responsible under the
principles of command responsibly. It must be recognised that in such
case military practice, whose purpose is to establish the internal order
and discipline necessary to run the armed forces, and from which the
power to punish flows, falls short of achieving its objective.
62
The issue reached the Appeals Chamber again in the Prosecutor v. Oric case,
a panel that again included Judge Shahabuddeen. The Oric Trial Chamber had
offered that while it too disagreed with the position taken by the Hadlihasanovi5
majority, it was legally bound to follow it.63  Since the duty to punish only
becomes relevant when the crime is discovered, not when it is committed, often a
superior would be obligated to take punitive measures even when he or she had no
ability to prevent the crimes due to his lack of awareness. Therefore, the Trial
Chamber suggested that "it seems only logical that such an obligation [to punish]
would also extend to the situation wherein there has been a change of command
following the commission of a crime by a subordinate."
64
The issue was raised on appeal. This time, a three-two majority, including
65Judge Shahabuddeen, was positioned to reverse Hadihasanovic. But curiously,
Judge Shahahabuddeen declined the opportunity to do so. He acknowledged
justifications for the reversal. He explained that one Appeals Chamber could, even
in a three-two decision, reverse the previous Appeal Chamber position. 66  He
referenced the support that a reversal would have, mentioning that fourteen ICTY
judges had expressed opposition to the HadlihasanoviW decision in subsequent
cases. 67 But notwithstanding this, he deferred to a cryptic judicial code wherein a
dissenting judge should not form part of a subsequent overturning three-two
61. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 715 (Sept. 1, 2004).
62. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, 199 (Mar. 15,
2006).
63. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03,68-T, Judgment, 335 (June 30, 2006).
64. Id.
65. See Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 3 (July 3, 2008) (Shahabuddeen, J.,
declaration).




majority, or at least he should do so with economy. 68 In Shahabuddeen's view,
decorum commended that an incorrect expression of law shall remain in place until
"such time when a more solid majority shares the views of those two judges.69
The irony of this puzzling stand is highlighted by the dissents by Judges Liu
and Schomberg, both of which now take up the position so persuasively argued by
Shahabuddeen himself in his Hadiihasanovi6 dissent.70  Judge Liu issues a
particularly spirited dissent. He submits that the Appeals Chamber should have
reversed the Hadihasanovi decision for many reasons. First, its failure to do
"gives the impression .. .that [it] considers such [a] challenge unfounded" or
"disagrees with the challenge.' Its refusal to reverse avoids its responsibility to
address legal challenges to its own decisions, he submits. To Judge Liu, the issue
is an important one. "The exceptional nature and general significance of the
question whether a commander can be held responsible under Article 7(3) of the
Statute for failing to punish the crimes of which he had knowledge, but were
perpetrated before he assumed command" Judge Liu offers, "is undoubtedly of
fundamental importance to our jurisprudence., 72 He explains that the failure to
correct such an erroneous decision will only serve to generate uncertainty, and
cause confusion in the determination of the law by parties to cases before the
International Tribunal.
Thus, the Haddihasanovi6 decision continues to represent the law of the ICTY
and ICTR despite the tenuous grounds on which it currently rests. It is therefore
worthwhile to amplify two of the bases of the HadiihasanoviW majority that
continue the successor liability debate: Article 86 of Additional Protocol I and
Article 28 of the Rome Statute.
2. Appeals Chamber's flawed reliance on Articles 86 of Additional Protocol I
and Article 28 of the Rome Statute as evidence of custom
a. Article 86 of Protocol I
The source of the debate over successor liability can be traced to the modem
codification of command responsibility in the 1970s that is, in part, represented by
Article 86 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.7 3 This Protocol and
Protocol II came about after increasing dissatisfaction among nations throughout
the 1950s and 1960s with the definitional rigidity of the original Geneva
Conventions passed in 1949. Nations convened the Diplomatic Conference of
Geneva in 1974 with the aim of issuing an amending treaty to modernize the 1949
Convention's strict view of armed conflict that was oriented to conflicts between
68. Id. 14.
69. Id. 115.
70. See id. 1-2 (Liu, J., dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration); see, e.g., id.
12-13 (Schomburg, J., dissenting) (separate and partially dissenting opinion).
71. Id. 3 (Liu, J., dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration).
72. Id. 5.
73. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 22 (July 16,
2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
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states deploying uniformed armed forces. 74 These definitions increasingly did not
adequately reflect modem armed conflicts that emerged after World War II. The
post WWII-era conflicts often had less to do with territorial conquest and more to
do with political issues such as the liberation of colonies in Africa and Asia, the
foreign occupation of states in the cold war, and racist regimes such apartheid in
South Africa. The Geneva conference sought to broaden the 1949 definitions to
extend protections to these new kinds of conflicts. In addition, the conference
sought to more adequately protect the victims in such conflicts. With these broad
aspirations in mind, in 1977 the conference issued its results after three years of
labor with a new convention that became known as Additional Protocol 1.
75
While the Hadlihasanovi majority focused exclusively on Article 86, two
provisions of Additional Protocol I codified the responsibility of commanders:
Articles 86 and 87. Article 86 provides:
Failure to act
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all
other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from
a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal
or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had
information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the breach.76
Article 87 set forth the duty of commanders. It provides
Duty of commanders
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed
forces under their command and other persons under their control, to
prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties
and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their
level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed
forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the
Conventions and this Protocol.
74. See generally George H. Aldrich, New Lifefor the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764 (1981)
(detailing the major changes made by the Protocols based on the changing nature of modern warfare).
75. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter
Protocol 1].
76. Id. at art. 86 (emphasis added).
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3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under
his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the
Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to
prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof 7
The crux of the problem, of course, lies in inconsistency in the tenses in
Articles 86 and 87. Article 86 uses the present tense, referring to a commander's
liability where a subordinate was committing or about to commit a breach whereas
Article 87 uses the past tense, requiring a commander to act where subordinates
have committed breaches. Article 86 seemingly precludes successor liability,
Article 87 supports it.
Whether or not this discrepancy between Articles 86 and 87 was intentional is
dubious. It would seem doubtful that the drafters of the Articles would have
preferred the present inconsistent language and the inevitable ensuing ambiguities.
Moreover, the official commentaries on the articles do not seem to grasp the
significance of the language. In its explanation of Article 86, the commentary uses
the past tense (i.e. the language of Article 87) stating that a commander "is to be
responsible for an omission relating to an offence committed or about to be
committed by a subordinate. 78 If the tense had been a critical issue in the drafting
of the article, one would presume that the commentary would have been more
sensitive to the nuances of the language and the commentators would have been
more precise.
How does one reconcile Articles 86 and 87? When attempting to clarify an
inherent ambiguity in a statute, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
",79light of its object and purpose.
The plain language of Article 86 suggests that its principal purpose was to
criminalize the superior's omission, an idea that the original Geneva Conventions
did not adequately address. The commentary on the provision confirms its purpose
was to close this loophole. 80 The commentary does not discuss the relevance of the
use of the present tense only. Article 87, aptly entitled "Duty of Commanders,"
elaborates on those duties of omission and enjoins states to enact enabling
legislation. 81 A good faith interpretation of the two Articles would be that the two
Articles should be read together. In that vein, the Hadiihasanovi c majority's
selective reliance only on Article 86 is unfounded.
77. Id. at art. 87 (emphasis added).
78. Protocol I, supra note 75, at art. 86 cmt. 3543 (emphasis added).
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
80. Protocol I, supra note 75, at 86 cmt. 3525-26.
81. See id. 3549-51.
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The Article 86 and 87 commentaries support this view. Paragraph 3541 of the
Commentaries explicitly states that Article 86 "should be read in conjunction with
paragraph 1 and Article 87 ...which lays down the 
duties of commanders."
82
This is supported by a later provision that explains that
[t]his rule [Article 86] concerns both the immediate commander and his
superiors. However, the specific duties of commanders are further dealt
with in the detailed provisions which will be examined under Article 87
'(Duties of commanders).' The present provision merely poses the
principle of the indictment of superiors who have tolerated breaches of
the law of armed conflict. 83
Therefore, if the two Articles were meant to be read together, a collective
interpretation must be deduced. Moreover, it is clear from the commentaries that
the envisioned scope of the duty was expansive and should include past breaches.
An insightful passage can be found in paragraph 3555 which says
[T]he text [of Article 87] does not limit the obligation of commanders to
apply only with respect to members of the armed forces under their
command; it is further extended to apply with respect to 'other persons
under their control.' It is particularly, though not exclusively, (9) in
occupied territory that this concept of indirect subordination may arise,
in contrast with the link of direct subordination which relates the
tactical commander to his troops. Territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised. (10) Consequently the commander on
the spot must consider that the local population entrusted to him is
subject to his authority in the sense of Article 87, for example, in the
case where some of the inhabitants were to undertake some sort of
pogrom (11) against minority groups. He is responsible for restoring
and ensuring public order and safety as far as possible, (12) and shall
take all measures in his power to achieve this, (13) even with regard to
troops which are not directly subordinate to him, if these are operating
in his sector. (14) A fortiori he must consider them to be under his
authority if they commit, or threaten to commit, any breaches of the
rules of the Conventions against persons for whom he is responsible. As
regards the commander who, without being invested with responsibility
in the sector concerned, discovers that breaches have been committed or
are about to be committed, he is obliged to do everything in his power
to deal with this, particularly by informing the responsible commander.
84
The relevance of paragraph 3555 is that it takes a liberal view of a
commander's responsibility toward breaches. In the example cited in the
82. Id. 1 3541.
83. Id. 3547.
84. Id. 3555 (emphasis added).
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paragraph, the commentator suggests that commanders have a responsibility to not
only their subordinates but a range of other persons who fall under the control. It
goes on to argue that a commander's reporting responsibility even extends to
situations where he learns of breaches outside his geographic area of
responsibility. The operative issue for the commentator is not whether or not the
commander had the ability to control subordinates and an ability to prevent the
breaches, but only whether he learned of their commission at some point.
Under this view, a good faith interpretation of the two Articles read together
would be that they intended to create a broad obligation for commanders to pursue
known breaches including those that would constitute successor liability.
The Hadihasanovi5 majority relies on two supplemental resources to support
its parochial interpretation: the Report of the International Law Commission and
Article 6 of the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind.
Judge Liu in his dissent takes issue with this reliance, deftly pointing out the
imprecision of language that was pervasive.85
As Judge Liu surmises, the Hadihasanovi6 majority's "error in the
interpretation of Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I... represents a cogent
reason" to reverse.
86
b. Article 28 of the Rome Statute
The HadiihasanoviW majority also relied upon the command responsibility
provision contained in Article 28 of the Rome Statute8 7 which mirrors the language
of Article 86 and by its terms seemingly excludes successor liability. The majority
argued that this was evidence of an international custom that weighed against
88successor liability.
The Rome Treaty's version of command responsibility provides that
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as
the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces
were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
85. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 13, 18-24 (July 3, 2008) (Liu, J.,
dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration).
86. Id. 28.
87. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
88. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 46 (July 16,
2003).
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(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
89
On its face, Article 28 seems to preclude successor liability when it followed
the Article 86 language but this interpretation is problematic. Paragraphs (i) and
(ii) are not easily reconcilable. On the one hand, paragraph (i) limits a
commander's criminal responsibility to situations where forces were committing or
about to commit crimes. On the other hand, paragraph (ii) obligates a commander
to submit these situations to competent authorities for, investigation and
prosecution. Because neither war crimes nor crimes against humanity include
inchoate crimes, the underlying act needs to be completed in order for a war crime
or crime against humanity to exist. Logically, it is inconsistent for a commander to
submit a war crime or crime against humanity that was about to be committed for
investigation, when legally they would not exist in that inchoate state. It would not
make much sense in the Rome Statute, principally concerned with war crimes and
crimes against humanity, to have included Article 28 a provision with such
obvious importance that would not pertain to a significant number of its
provisions.9°
Notwithstanding that, the reliance on Article 28 as evidence of custom is a
poor argument. The drafting of the Rome Statute can easily be seen as an exercise
in compromise rather than an attempt to articulate custom. More importantly, as
discussed supra, every other tribunal enacted - before and after the Rome Statute -
has a statute with command responsibility provisions that reflect Article 87.91
Because these statutes use the Article 87 language, if one were to attempt to derive
a custom based on the statutes of all of the tribunals, even including the ICC, the
evidence would support a custom of command responsibility based on Article 87.
Judge Liu in his dissent also points out an obvious flaw in Article 28, that
under its clear terms, Article 28 wouldn't cover past crimes, even for a superior
who had effective control over subordinates at the time of commission. 92 Ample
jurisprudence from the tribunals establishes that a duty to punish arises after the
superior acquires knowledge of the commission, contrary to Article 28. 9'
89. Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 28(a) (emphasis added). Note that Article 28(b)
pertaining to civilian commanders has a different mens rea, but the operative language for the purposes
of this discussion is the same.
90. The only inchoate offense recognized by the Rome Statute as a general principle is the offense
of criminal attempt. With regard to Genocide only, the Rome Statute includes the inchoate offense of
direct and public indictment to commit genocide. Id. at art. 25(3)(e)-(f).
91. The ICTY codified commander responsibility in 1993 using the Article 87 terminology. The
ICTR followed suit with identical language to that of ICTY in 1994. The SCSL adopted its statute in
2000, also with Article 87 language. In 2004, the ECCC enacted its command responsibility statute that
also followed the Article 87 language. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
92. See Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 25 (July 3, 2008) (Liu, J.,
dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration).
93. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 19-21 (July
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Even though the Hadihasanovie decision remains the law, it rests on
perilously tenuous grounds and there is reason to believe that a future Appeals
Chamber will give due consideration to overturning Hadihasanovi6. Despite the
fact that it is unlikely to be litigated at the ICC because of Article 28,94 command
responsibility is now being litigated in more numerous and diverse fora, including
domestic prosecutions invoking universal jurisdiction95 and civil suits in the United
States applying the alien tort claims statute and the torture victims protection act
96
that present more opportunity for legal challenges.
That successor liability sits on the precipice begs the question as to whether
successor liability is a desirable development or not. The election of Barack
Obama presents just such an opportunity to examine successor liability as a
principle of customary international law in application.97 And the Obama scenario
presents an interesting juxtaposition to Had~ihasanovi6: Kabura was a successor
commander who shared the intent of his predecessor and perpetuated his criminal
policies and practices. On the one hand, the application of successor liability in the
case of Kabura poses no significant moral issue since Kabura participated in the
criminal enterprise to some extent. On the other hand, President Obama is a
successor commander who vigorously opposed his predecessor's policies and to
potentially incur criminal liability for their commission presents a moral dilemma.
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY & CLEAN-HANDS REGIMES: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
Before delving into an analysis of successor liability as applied to successor
regimes using President Obama as the example, it is helpful to discuss briefly some
of the alleged commission of crimes committed by subordinates that he has
inherited. 98 It is important to preface this discussion with the observation that
Obama's duty under command responsibility is triggered upon a showing that he
had some general information in his possession which would put him on notice of
possible unlawful acts by his subordinates. 99  It is not necessary that the
16, 2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
94. Because the Rome Treaty has, at the moment, 131 signatories and so changing the language of
Article 28 would require the require a vote of two-thirds of the States Parties per Article 121of the
Rome Statute. The Rome Statute has a provision for "elements of crimes" supplemental definitions that
help interpret the Statute. Member States can propose elements that require a two-thirds majority of
the Assembly of States Parties to be adopted, but this applies only to the core crimes and not modes of
liability. Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 9.
95. Marlise Simons, Mother Superior's Role in Rwanda Horror is Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2001, at A3; Spain to Investigate Guatemalan Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at A4.
96. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106
Stat. 73 (1992).
97. It is important to note that we could have easily based this section of the article on President
Sir-Leaf Johnson, Prime Minister Gordon or another recently elected leader who opposed the impugned
policies of his predecessor and assumed command over common subordinates.
98. This is by no means an assertion of the legal or substantive merit of these claims and the
authors do not take a position one way or the other on their validity, but rather view them in light only
of their relevance as triggering mechanisms of a duty to punish.
99. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Land.o, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 222-41
(Feb. 20, 2001).
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information available to Obama amounts to proof sufficient for a criminal
conviction. The triggering information need not be about specific acts, but can be
of a general criminal character. 100 And although the allegations below have been
subject of vigorous public debate including numerous comments by President
Obama himself during his presidential campaign that clearly show knowledge, 0 1 it
is theoretically not necessary to show that Obama acquainted himself with the
available information for the triggering to occur, but merely that it had been
provided to him, made available to him or was in his possession.
A. Allegations of Crimes Committed the Bush Administration
1. Torture
The most high-profile allegation leveled against the Bush administration since
the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the torture of al Qaeda
and Taliban detainees. In late 2002, the first reports began to surface of the alleged
torture of suspected al Qaeda detainees at the Bagram air base in Afghanistan.
1 2
Interviews with unnamed intelligence officials revealed the use of stress
techniques, water-boarding and extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to
foreign countries whose use of torture was well-known, e.g., Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt. In 2004, pictures surfaced showing U.S. Army officials engaged in
torture and abuse of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. While several
military personnel were court-martialed for their involvement in the scandal, the
use of tortuous interrogation techniques did not end there. On October 24, 2008,
Vice President Cheney issued the administration's first public endorsement of
water-boarding; a position that ran contrary to that of the U.S. Pentagon which,
two years prior, had issued a Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation that
explicitly prohibited water-boarding.
10 3
Torture committed during an international armed conflict is a violation of the
law of war. Under the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (Third Geneva Convention), torture of prisoners of war (POWs) during
questioning is specifically prohibited'0 4 and "[a]ny unlawful act or omission by the
Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of
war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach" of the
Convention. 10 5  Furthermore, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions
prohibits "[v]iolence to life and person, in particular . . . cruel treatment and
torture" against a number of persons, including those taking no part in the
100. Id. 238.
101. See The Associated Press, Obama: U.S. Will Not Torture, MSNBC.com (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28574408; Leonard Doyle, Obama Would 'Immediately Review'
Torture Crimes, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 16, 2008, available at http://blogs.independent.co.
uk/the campaign_trailers/2008/04/obama-would-imm.html.
102. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
103. U.S.: Vice President Endorses Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/10/ 2 5 /us-vice-president-endorses-torture.
104. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, at arts. 17, 87.
105. Id. at art. 13.
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hostilities and members of armed forces who have been taken out of the theatre of
war as a result of detention or any other cause.
10 6
The generally accepted definition of torture is that which is set forth in the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention). According to this
definition, torture is any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
10 7
Under international law, torture is proscribed as a crime against humanity and
a war crime. 1°8 Neither proscription follows the Torture Convention in requiring
that the torture be carried out by public official, or with his acquiescence.'
0 9
With respect to the prohibition against torture in the Third Geneva
Convention, the initial argument of the Bush administration was not that the
techniques used by U.S. interrogators were not torture but rather that the
individuals supposedly subjected to these techniques were not protected by the
Geneva Convention.110 A prisoner of war is defined as a member of armed forces
or member of other militia or volunteer corps that fulfill a number of conditions:
they are commanded by a person responsible for subordinates; they have a
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; they carry arms openly; and they
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs or war."'
Because Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and terrorists in general, do not wage war
in accordance with the recognized laws and customs of war - e.g. they do not
identify themselves or carry arms openly - the Bush administration deemed them
.'enemy combatants" - an undefined and distinct third category of individuals who
were not entitled to the protections under the Geneva Conventions.
112
In the alternative, the Bush administration also argued that the techniques
used in the interrogation of detainees - water-boarding in particular - did not fall
within the definition of torture; despite an extensive historical treatment of water-
106. Id. at art. 3(1)(a).
107. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
108. See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, 147 (Sept. 17, 2003).
109. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 148 (June 12,
2002).
1 10. E.g., Lionel Beehner, Backgrounder: Torture, the United States, and Laws of War, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Nov. 11, 2005.
111. Geneva Convention 1II, supra note 12, at art. 4(2).
112. Beehner, supra note 110.
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boarding directly contradicting this assertion.113 In a 2002 memo written by Jay
Bybee, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, the administration redefined torture as
[p]hysical pain . equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount
to torture . . . it must result in significant psychological harm of
significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.'
14
Under this definition, the administration argued that the pain caused by water-
boarding did not rise to a level of intensity that would constitute torture. In a
second memo - also authored by Bybee but that remains classified - a list of
interrogation techniques were analyzed and approved - including water-
boarding. 1
15
Related to the issue of torture is the Bush administration's use of
"extraordinary rendition" - the practice whereby detainees and suspected terrorists
are transferred to other countries where they are usually detained indefinitely with
a high possibility that they will be tortured.' 16 This practice violates Article 3 of
the Torture Convention which prohibits the expulsion, return or extradition of an
individual "to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
' 17
2. Unlawful Detainment
In addition to the crimes of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment perpetrated against detainees, the very circumstances under which many
of these individuals have been detained - indefinitely and without due process -
arguably violates the Geneva Conventions. Under the Third Geneva Convention,
an individual falls into one of two legal classifications - combatants or civilians
113. The United States has historically treated water-boarding as torture. In 1901, Major Edwin
Glenn was convicted for subjecting a suspected Philippine insurgent to the technique and in 1968 a U.S.
army officer was court-martialed for his assistance in water-boarding a Vietnamese prisoner of war.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East found several Japanese soldiers guilty of war crimes
for water-boarding U.S. prisoners. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103.
114. Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/cheney/torture memo aug2002.pdf.
115. The approval of water-boarding in the memo was garnered from a publicly released CIA
document. The full list remains classified. U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xvi (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://graphics8.
nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/report-by-the-senate-armed-services-committee-on-detainee-
treatment/original.pdf.
116. As a legal term, extraordinary rendition does not exist. The practice of rendition generally
describes the practice of forcibly abducting individuals from a state unwilling to prosecute them in
order to bring them to trial in a state willing to prosecute. The term "'extraordinary rendition" has since
evolved to reflect the extraordinary nature of the process "in the sense that it has bypassed all judicial
processes." J. Troy Lavers, Extraordinaiy Rendition and the Self-Defense Justification: Time to Face
the Music, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 385, 386-87 (2007).
117. Torture Convention, supra note 107, at art. 3(1).
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(non-combatants) - and each group is afforded protections based upon their
classification. With respect to detainment, once captured, combatants become
prisoners of war. The Convention authorizes a Party to detain prisoners of war
until the cessation of active hostilities, at which point prisoners of war must be
released and repatriated, without delay.
11 8
If the detainee does not qualify under the Third Geneva Convention as a
prisoner of war, the ICTY has held that the person qualifies as a civilian under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. Under international law, there is no intermediate
status.1 19 This is supported by The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention
which asserts that:
[e]very person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by
the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or
again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is
covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel that this is a
satisfactory solution - not only satisfying to the mind, but also, and
above all, satisfactory from the humanitarian point of view. 120
Where there is doubt as to whether an individual meets the legal classification
as a prisoner of war, the detainee's status must be determined by a competent
tribunal and until this determination they are afforded the protections of the
Convention.
B. Obama's Liability as Bush's Successor
On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn into office as the 4 5 th
president of the United States. Concurrently with the inauguration, the former
president of Liberia Charles Taylor was on trial for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and the ICC had indicted the president of Sudan Omar al-Bashir. With
sovereign immunity in retreat, President Obama assumed his role as Commander-
in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces with its many military subordinates, many of
whom also served under President Bush. Under successor liability, Obama would
be liable for those subordinates' crimes - discussed above - if three elements are
satisfied: a superior-subordinate relationship exists between Obama and the
subordinates, Obama has an awareness of the subordinates' alleged criminal acts,
and Obama subsequently fails to punish those subordinates.
118. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, at art. 118.
119. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 271 (Nov. 16,
1998) (noting there "is no gap between the Third and the Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an individual
is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of the First or Second
Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4
requirements are satisfied.")
120. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4 cmt. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
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1. Existence of a Superior-Subordinate Relationship
The superior-subordinate relationship exists where a commander has effective
control over the subordinates, which in turn is said to exist when the superior has
the material ability to prevent subordinates from committing breaches or the
material ability to punish them. 21 The superior-subordinate relationship can occur
in either de jure or de facto circumstances and it is also well-established that a
civilian head of state who wields the requisite effective control over military
subordinates qualifies as a requisite superior - subordinate relationship. 22 For
both types of commanders, the ad hoc tribunals have recognized a number of
situations that would support a finding of effective control, including: de jure
authority to issue binding orders; dejure or defacto authority to order disciplinary
measures against subordinates and to detain alleged subordinates; de jure or de
facto authority to remove subordinate commanders from duty; and where the
accused commander held himself out as commander in title and behavior and the
subordinate respected and acted in accordance with such a superior-subordinate
relationship. 123 With respect to a civilian superior, a finding of effective control
would be supported where the civilian exercised control in a military fashion or
similar form. 124 Further, two or more superiors may be held responsible for the
same crime perpetrated by the same individual if it is established that the principal
offender was under the command of both superiors at the relevant time. 12
5
The constitution of the United States establishes the President's de jure
command over the armed forces, providing that the President "shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several states.' 26 The National Security Act of 1947 extended this
authority over the Air Force. 127 The President's authority over all U.S. armed
forces was consolidated even further with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.128 This act streamlined the military chain-of-
command so that commanders of the armed forces responded directly to the
President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 29 In
addition, Title 10 of the United States Code provides the legal basis for the
President's role as dejure commander in chief' 30
121. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Deli6 & Land2o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 378 (Nov. 16,
1998).
122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 87 (May 23, 2005).
123. Boas et al., supra note 50, at 199.
124. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 87 (May 23, 2005).
125. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, 93 (Mar. 15, 2002).
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
127. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.S. § 401 (2008).
128. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 10 U.S.C.S. § 11
(2008).
129. National Defense University Library, Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2009).
130. See 1OU.S.C.S. §111.
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However, the de jure position is only the starting point of the analysis; actual
authority is not decided by the existence of a formal position.13 1 Whether or not
Obama is a superior must be determined based upon the reality of his authority.
132
This authority of U.S. Presidents over the military is not ceremonial. U.S.
Presidents have traditionally exercised a direct, involved and public role as the
Commander-in-Chief, deciding when and where to engage in armed conflict,
setting budgets and policy, and generally signing off on all key issues regarding the
war. As a matter of course, U.S. Presidents get daily intelligence briefings on
military matters.133 In the case of the Iraq war, President Bush met personally with
General Tommy Ray Franks to plan the invasion of Iraq shortly after the
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Towers 134 - General Franks was
Commander of the United States Central Command, overseeing U.S. Armed
Forces operations in a twenty five-country region including the Middle East - and
Bush was integrally involved in the decision to invade Iraq.' 35  Bush also
personally made key tactical decisions that resulted in the implementation of the
policies of torture and indefinite detention. 
136
On January 20, 2009, all of the armed forces previously subordinated to Bush
became subordinated to Obama. In his first two months, Obama was no less
involved in exercising effective control over the armed forces than Bush had been.
In fact, he was aggressive in implementing key military decisions, including a
decision setting a date to withdraw combat forces from Iraq, 37 a decision to close
the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay 138 and the decision to cease the use of the
term of "enemy combatants."'
139
The clear leadership in the form of policy decisions and orders issued by both
Presidents Bush and Obama to the armed forces, as well as the subordinate's
compliance with those orders, is a strong indication of a superior - subordinate
relationship. 140 The key factor is the commander's material ability to prevent or
punish acts. 141 Being able to implement quick decisions to conclude detention at
131. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 418 (Feb. 26, 2001).
132. See id.
133. See Walter Pincus, Under Bush, the Briefing Gets Briefer, WASH. POST, May 24, 2002, at
A33.
134. William Hamilton, Bush Began to Plan War Three Months after 9/11, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,
2004, at AOl.
135. Sarah Baxter, Powell Tried to Talk Bush out of War, SUNDAY TIMES, July 8, 2007, available
at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us and americas/article2042072.ece.
136. Interview by Brit Hume with President George W. Bush, President, United States (Jan. 11,
2009), available at http://thinkprogress.org/2009/01/1 I/bush-authorized-torture.
137. Peter Baker & Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Favoring Mid-2010 Pullout in Iraq, Aides Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at Al.
138. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2008, at
A01.
139. Obama to End Use of Term 'Enemy Combatant', ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 12, 2009.
140. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 397 (Feb.
22, 2001).
141. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 302 (Mar. 3, 2000).
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Guantanamo is but one example of President Obama's material ability to prevent
commissions and consequently evidence of his effective control.
President Obama cannot claim attenuation from the subordinates as a defense.
Under international law, the superior-subordinate relationship is based upon the
notion of control within a hierarchy, not necessary control based on the personal
relationship. 142 The hierarchy can be quite broad. The ICTY indicted President
Slobodan Milogevi6 of Serbia under a command responsibility for crimes
committed by Bosnian-Serb forces - a different country's armed forces -
committed in the neighboring country of Bosnian.1 43 The ICC similarly indicted
Omar al-Bashir for crimes committed byjanjaweed militia forces. The operative
fact is the commander's effective control over his subordinates reflected in his
ability to exert control. In a professional military such as the U.S. armed forces,
with clear hierarchies, with Obama sitting at the apex as Commander-in-Chief, his
effective control over all of the impugned subordinates is clear.
Effective control is the key determination in command responsibility, but
when that effective control exists is crucial to successor liability. Under the
current law, it is necessary that the effective control existed at the time of the
commission of the offenses. Under successor liability, effective control must exist
when the knowledge of the offenses is obtained.
2. Knowledge
While some tribunals have considered the argument that command
responsibility should be a strict liability offense, 144 such a reading has been
rejected and, in order for a superior to incur liability for the crimes committed by a
subordinate, he must have known about the crimes. 1
45
Two types of knowledge are recognized in this context: actual and
constructive. Actual knowledge is, as its name suggests, actual knowledge -
established through either direct or circumstantial evidence -the superior has of the
crimes committed by the subordinate or actual knowledge of the crimes that the
subordinate plans to commit. Actual knowledge may also be inferred through
circumstantial evidence, for example, by a commander's superior position and the
existence of an organized military structure with established and functioning
reporting systems. 46 The Blaskic Appeals Chamber considered the superior's
physical proximity to the subordinate when the latter committed the crimes.
147
Constructive knowledge, on the other hand, applies to situations where a
superior does not have actual knowledge but knowledge should nevertheless be
142. Prosecutor v. Delali, Muci6, Deli & Land~o Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 248-54 (Feb.
20, 2001).
143. Prosecutor v. Miloievi6, Case No. IT-01-51-1, Initial Indictment "Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
Indictment, 127-31 (Nov. 22, 2001).
144. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Deli & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 1 353
(Nov. 16, 1998).
145. Prosecutor v. Blagojevik & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60, Judgment, 686 (Jan. 17, 2005).




imputed to the superior because the circumstances of the situation are such that the
superior should have known. Knowledge may be imputed where the superior turns
a blind eye to the crimes that were about to be, or had been, committed or where
the superior's negligence in performing his duties precluded him from learning of
the crimes.148
Knowledge may also be imputed where information was available that the
crimes were either about to be committed or had been committed, and that the
information was sufficiently available and credible so that the superior was put on
notice of the need for further investigation. 149 A number of cases have cited the
following factors as examples of the type of information that is sufficient to trigger
a duty to investigate: reports addressed to the commander that draw his attention to
1) the behavior of the subordinates alleged to have committed the crimes; 2) the
tactical situation; 3) the level and training and instruction of the subordinates; and
4) known character and behavioral traits of the subordinates .
15 0
In the case of Obama, his knowledge of offenses potentially committed by the
Bush administration is irrefutable. The Bush policies, discussed supra, were
public, front-page news and widely-debated. Knowledge would certainly be
imputed to a presidential candidate presumed to have been briefed on relevant
campaign issues. Regardless, in this instance Obama made the aforementioned
crimes key issues in his campaign platform, clearly establishing his actual
knowledge. In numerous Senate and presidential campaign statements, Obama
publically challenged, in detail, the Bush administration on its military policies
including torture and indefinite detention. 51 In one example, Obama reacted to
newspaper stories about the Bush administration's authorization of brutal
interrogation techniques by issuing the following statement:
The secret authorization of brutal interrogations is an outrageous
betrayal of our core values, and a grave danger to our security. We must
do whatever it takes to track down and capture or kill terrorists, but
torture is not a part of the answer it is a fundamental part of the
problem with this administration's approach. Torture is how you create
enemies, not how you defeat them. Torture is how you get bad
information, not good intelligence. Torture is how you set back
America's standing in the world, not how you strengthen it. It's time to
tell the world that America rejects torture without exception or
equivocation. It's time to stop telling the American people one thing in
public while doing something else in the shadows. No more secret
authorization of methods like simulated drowning. When I am president
America will once again be the country that stands up to these
148. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, 332 (Mar. 3, 2000).
149. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 383 (Nov.
16, 1998).
150. Prosecutor v. Had2ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, 99 (Mar. 15,
2006).
151. Senator Barack Obama, Statement on the Military Commissions Legislation (Sept. 28, 2006),
available at http://obamaspeeches.com092-Military-Commission-Legislation-Obama-Speech.htm.
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deplorable tactics. When I am president we won't work in secret to
avoid honoring our laws and Constitution, we will be straight with the
American people and true to our values.
1 52
In another official statement, Obama decried the "low road" taken by the
Bush administration, mentioning the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo detention
facilities as deviations from international norms:
This brings me to the fourth step in my strategy: I will make clear
that the days of compromising our values are over.
When I am President, America will reject torture without
exception. America is the country that stood against that kind of
behavior, and we will do so again.
I also will reject a legal framework that does not work. . . As
President, I will close Guantanamo, reject the Military Commissions
Act, and adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Our Constitution and our
Uniform Code of Military Justice provide a framework for dealing with
the terrorists.'
53
Again, the key consideration here is not whether President Obama has
knowledge that crimes were potentially committed in the Bush regime, but that he
has information that his current subordinates have committed crimes. It is the
latter information that invokes his responsibility to punish as their superior. And
while many of the high-level operatives in the Bush administration responsible for
drafting and implementing the policies of torture and detention did not carry over
into Obama's administration, many lower-level subordinates did.'5 4 And given the
extent of the crimes across several agencies, involving hundreds if not thousands
of personnel, committed in several regions of the world, Obama would have reason
to know that some of these subordinates remain in the military.
3. Failure to Punish
The third and final element of the successor liability analysis is the failure to
punish subordinates, a two-prong analysis centering on whether a commander took
those measures "necessary and reasonable" to punish crimes. Successor liability,
therefore, would dictate that President Obama take all necessary and reasonable
measures to punish his current subordinates who he knows, or has information that
suggests, may have committed crimes.
152. Obama News and Speeches, Torture and Secrecy Betray Core American Values,
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/04/obama torture andsecrecy betr.php.
153. Senator Barack Obama, Speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center (Aug. 1, 2007)
(transcript available through the Council on Foreign Relations).
154. The most interesting subordinate may be Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who continued in
that position after having succeeded Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the same position in the Bush
Administration. See Peter Banker & Thom Shanker, Obama Planning to Retain Gates as Defense
Chief N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A23.
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A commander's duty to prevent is triggered when he either learns of the
subordinate's plans to commit the crimes or when he has reason to know, based on
information available to him. Similarly, the duty to punish arises when the
commander learns - after the fact - that the crimes had been committed by the
subordinate or when he has reason to know of their commission.
With respect to whether the punishment is sufficient to satisfy the duty, a
commander must take "necessary and reasonable" measures to prevent or
punish. 155 "Necessary" has been defined as those measures required to discharge
the obligation to punish in the circumstances prevailing at the time 156 and those
measures which the commander was in a position to take in the circumstances. 157
What constitutes a reasonable measure depends on the relationship between the
superior and the subordinate. 158  Thus, in the theatre of war, a battlefield
commander who is a direct superior to a soldier (such as Had~ihasanovid) would
have different obligations than one farther up the command chain, residing far
from any theatre of conflict, and having a very indirect relationship with most
subordinates. One consideration regarding reasonable measures is effective
control:
[I]t is a commander's degree of effective control, his material ability,
which will guide the Trial Chamber in determining whether he
reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to
punish the perpetrator . . [T]his implies that, under some
circumstances, a commander may discharge his obligation to prevent or
punish by reporting the matter to the competent authorities.'
59
Thus, unlike a heat of battle situation where a commander may be the person
obligated to dispense immediate punishment, in other circumstances the obligation
could be discharged simply by referring the matter to competent authorities for
investigation. A commander is not obligated to perform the impossible, but they
must use every means in their power.' 61 What is clear is that whatever steps are
taken, a commander needs to be an important step in the disciplinary process.
162
What constitutes a reasonable measure depends on the relationship between
the superior and subordinate. While a battlefield commander may have limited
disciplinary options, President Obama has few restrictions in this regard. He sets
the policy, budgets and strategy for the armed forces. 163 He has ample resources at
155. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Delid & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 346(iii) (Nov.
16, 1998).
156. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 47 (June 7, 2001).
157. Id.
158. See Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 441-45 (Feb. 26,
2001).
159. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 335 (Mar. 3, 2000).
160. See Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 316 (Nov. 2, 2001).
161. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 95 (Mar. 15, 2002).
162. Prosecutor v. Kvoeka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 316 (Nov. 2, 2001).
163. See 10 U.S.C.S. at §11 l(a).
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
his disposal.164 He meets regularly with his Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of
Staff and other high-ranking military leaders who could and would give effect to
his orders regarding discipline. And he has a high degree of effective control over
the military and all those who are subordinated to him. Among these options,
President Obama has the power to create independent commissions or he can refer
the matter to his Secretary of Defense for investigation by the Judge Advocates
General Corp or to his Attorney General for investigation by the Department of
Justice. Therefore, while Obama is only obligated to do what is feasible, there are
virtually no measures outside his logistical realm of feasibility.
On the other hand, President Obama's obligations could arguably be limited
by the "necessary" prong, a subjective assessment. Many view an investigation as
necessary. The call for a truth commission - i.e. an investigation - into the use of
torture and other abuses of power by the Bush administration is the subject of a
growing national debate.1 65  Others argue that the United States military is
competent to conduct its own internal investigations.1 66  However, President
Obama is obligated to make his determination not on political considerations
alone, but also on his treaty obligation under the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols of 1977.167
To discharge these obligations, President Obama is required to act and this
action needs to be an "important step." 168 Obama could arguably discharge his
duty within the minimal act of referring the matter in good faith to the relevant
authorities directing that any criminal acts be investigated. 169 But in the initial
days of his administration, the clamor for Obama to take action was loud and
strong. 170  On one occasion soon after taking office, the issue of investigating
crimes was put directly to President Obama: "Will you appoint a Special
Prosecutor (ideally Patrick Fitzgerald) to independently investigate the gravest
crimes of the Bush Administration, including torture . ?,,171 Obama responded
that, "My view is also that nobody is above the law, and if there are clear instances
of wrongdoing, that people should be prosecuted just like any ordinary citizen; but
164. See Thom Shanker, Proposed Military Spending is Highest Since WWII, N.Y. TIMES, February
4, 2008.
165. See Nicholas D. Kristof, The Truth Commission, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at 12.
166. See inter alia, Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004.
167. Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Because of the U.S. has
signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. is bound by their provisions. U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§2.
168. See Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 316 (Nov. 2, 2001).
169. However, given the fact that Bush administration military policies emanated from Bush
himself in consultation with his key advisers, it may be that a referral to the military to investigate may
present a conflict of interest particularly since Minister Gates could himself be scrutinized as a
commander with command responsibility liability. In that view, the situation may require a referral to
an impartial investigation body outside of the entity to be scrutinized.
170. See Glenn Greenwald, The Effects of Obama's Refusal to Investigate Bush Crimes, Salon.com
(Jan. 20, 2007), http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/01/20/turley/index.html.




that generally speaking, I'm more interested in looking forward than I am in
looking backwards."
1 72
Appointing a Special Prosecutor would almost certainly qualify as a
reasonable and necessary measure thus discharging his successor liability duty to
punish. But the "looking forward" phrase has been a familiar Obama refrain, and
some commentators have taken this to mean that accountability is not part of
Obama's agenda, or it is at least not a priority given the economic crisis with
which he is confronted. 173 Time will tell whether the "looking forward" policy is
an indication of Obama's unwillingness to address the crimes, or it is simply a
public relations tactic that doesn't reflect actual, behind-the-scenes policy.
Ultimately, his actions - not just his words - would be measured against the
reasonable and necessary standard. And the vagueness of this guideline makes it
difficult to assess when he would be reasonably expected to act given his other
pressing demands. What is clear is that to discharge the duty, successor liability
would dictate that Obama, at some point, take an important step in the disciplinary
process; at a minimum delegating the matter to competent authorities. This would
be true even if that step occurred several years hence.
Obama would involve the novel circumstance of examining the duty to punish
contemporaneously with that duty. The Had4ihasanovi6 case litigated the issue
nearly ten years after the fact. Perhaps the failure to punish can ultimately only be
fully assessed in a retroactive examination. But the polemic raises an important
policy debate about the whether human rights and humanitarian law schemes
benefit from the pressure successor liability would apply to Obama and other
successor regimes to look backward.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Successor liability serves the goal of ending impunity
After the atrocities committed during World War II, the international
community set out to develop international legal obligations, designed to ensure
the world would never see such horrors repeated. The victors of World War II
brought German and Japanese war criminals to justice, building important
jurisprudence in international criminal law, the Fourth Geneva Convention was
drafted to protect civilians in times of armed conflict, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was developed and the
Torture Convention was enacted. 174 Each development represented an important
step forward in the international community's resolve to prevent and punish
international crimes. Despite these advances, however, there was a disconnect in
the development of international legal obligations and the willingness of the
international community to enforce them. In the decades that followed the
judgments of the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals, very few of the legal
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Mark S. Ellis, Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a Way to Promote
Peace and Stability: The Role of International War Crimes Tribunals, 2 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y
111, 114-15 (2006).
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
obligations that the international community zealously crafted were enforced. The
absence of enforcement was not due to an absence of crimes warranting
punishment, but rather the international community had fallen into a culture of
impunity, in which war crimes, genocide, torture, and grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention went unpunished.
175
The longest civil war in the region's history began in 1960 in Guatemala after
a military revolt that lead to a long-standing conflict between the government and
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity; an organization composed of a
number of leftist guerrilla groups. 176 It is estimated that approximately 200,000
people were killed or disappeared between 1960 and the conflict's end in 1996.177
A Commission was established to document the human rights violations and war
crimes committed during the conflict; however, of the more than 600 massacres
identified by the Commission, the perpetrators of all but one have yet to be held
accountable. 
178
Shortly after the Guatemalan civil war broke out in the mid- 1 960s, Colombia
became embroiled in a long-standing armed conflict between the government
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group, later becoming the National
Liberation Army (ELN). The conflict lasted for almost half a century (there is
debate whether it is even over), during which time both the government and
guerrilla organizations committed massive atrocities against civilian
populations. 179 These atrocities went largely unpunished and the 2005 Justice and
Peace Law essentially guaranteed crimes committed by government forces will
continue to go unpunished. 80
On the other side of the world from the conflicts raging in the Americas, the
Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia killed one-third of the Cambodian population -
approximately two million people - between 1975 and 1979.181 Rather than
prosecute those in the regime responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, many were granted amnesty by the Cambodian government and
attempts to bring these individuals to justice were repeated thwarted. 
182
Numerous other examples exist of this culture of impunity that stunted the
enforcement of international humanitarian and criminal law; however, in the last
few decades there has been a noticeable shift away from this attitude. Such a shift
is evident in the increasing number of international tribunals charged with holding
accountable those charged with serious crimes in addition to the increasingly
175. See generally id. (detailing the experiences in East Timor, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala,
Liberia, and Afghanistan).
176. Id. at 133-34.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 134-36.
179. See id. at 129, 130-32.
180. See id. at 129-31.
181. Id. at 125.
182. Id. at 126-28.
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willingness of governments, such as the Cambodian government, to bring
perpetrators of crimes to justice; after decades of delay.
Therefore, after decades of impunity, governments individually - and the
international community as a whole - have begun to finally implement the goals of
the Geneva Conventions and the other international agreements designed to ensure
enforcement; if not prevention as well. To this end, command responsibility is an
important tool in ending the attitude of impunity; the importance of which is
evidence in the codification of the theory and development of command liability
jurisprudence in the tribunals. Given the overarching purpose of the Geneva
Conventions, requiring Parties to "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
the present Convention in all circumstances," 183 successor liability is arguably an
equally important component in ending impunity. As one commentator offered:
Clearly there is an ethical imperative [to intervene to prevent war
crimes], and it is recognized by many commentators, both military and
legal. That principle supports enforcement of successor commanders'
duty to punish; the international humanitarian law community should
therefore take steps to close the current loophole through which
individuals who should be held responsible can now escape that
enforcement.
184
The absence of successor liability creates a gap that allows "wrongdoers to
escape reproach by the immediate superiors whenever the person in charge at the
time of the misconduct has been replaced by someone else.' 8 5 Commentators (and
Judge Shahabuddeen in the Hadihasanovie dissent) argue that by rejecting
successor liability, a successor commander is able to evade responsibility - an
outcome tantamount to condoning or concealing the crimes.
1 86
Some commentators fear that the Hadgihasanovi successor "gap" could
prove to be massive. The HadlihasanoviW majority inferred that the Article 87 past
tense language "have committed" was not customary law.18 7 By logical extension,
that would mean that command responsibility did not impose a duty to punish
crimes that "had been committed" even by the commander who had command at
the time of commission. s8 In other words, should that interpretation prevail a
commander may be under no duty to punish acts of subordinates that were
previously committed. 
189
183. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, at art. 1.
184. Carol T. Fox, Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commanders'
Duty to Punish Known Past Offenses, 55 CASE W. RES. 443, 500 (2004).
185. Boas et al., supra note 50, at 235.
186. See Fox, supra note 184, at 457-59.
187. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 44-47 (July
16, 2003).
188. Boas et al., supra note 50, at 236-37.
189. Id.
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B. Successor liability reflects the nature of combat
There are a number of circumstances unique to situations of war and military
structure that make a shift from command responsibility to successor liability a
rational step. First, given the inherently chaotic nature of warfare, there is no
guarantee that one's commander at the beginning of a conflict will be his
commander in the middle or at the end of the conflict. Commanders can be killed
or reassigned - after which the dynamics of the superior-subordinate relationship
and the previous commander's ability to prevent or punish have been altered.
Furthermore, unique to the U.S. military structure is a civilian commander whose
authority is inherently limited and expires within four to eight years after assuming
the position. It is characteristic with the U.S. system that when the Presidency
changes, so too do the political appointments in the administration, including
military commanders. Because command changes repeatedly in times of war,
there would be a serious gap in the system of protection if command responsibility
only applied to the person in command at the time at which the offence was
committed. 90 Judge Schomberg in his dissent echoes this, stating that "given the
rapid succession of military commanders in armed conflicts, the result of such an
interpretation would be to grant impunity to those who committed war crimes
under a predecessor."' 91 Commentators further point out that it is often difficult to
discipline contemporaneously in the theatre of war, so more often than not a
successor commander will be in place when an investigation is possible.
1 92
C. Successor liability would have a positive effect on sovereignty
A benefit of successor liability is to encourage a policy and practice that
promotes domestic accountability and militates against the imposition of
international jurisdiction. As set forth above, historically there has been little
incentive for successor regimes to look backward. They risk incurring the wrath
within tenuous political coalitions and weakening their own constituencies. The
political capital expended by initiating legitimate punitive processes may be
considered to be too costly for little domestic return. And many of the political
operatives in a former regime remain in politics and continue to wield substantial
influence.
With the advent of the ICC, however, that paradigm may change. The ICC
has jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 193 for acts
occurring on or after July, 2002, committed by nationals from state parties or
occurring in their territory. 94 It was conceived to assert itself where states are
190. See Prosecutor v. Had2ihasanovi6, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 14 (July 16,
2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
191. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 17 (July 3, 2008 (Schomburg, J.,
dissenting) (separate and partially dissenting opinion).
192. Fox, supra note 184, at 457.
193. Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 5.
194. Id. at art. 12.
VOL. 37:4
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
unwilling or unable to proceed with their own domestic proceedings. However,
per the Rome Statute the ICC must yield its jurisdiction to states who conduct their
own investigations and/or prosecutions. This principle, known as complimentarity,
is set forth in Article 17 which provides that a case is inadmissible before the ICC
where
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted
under article 20, paragraph 3 195
Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) both recognize the primacy of local, legitimate
state investigations. Sub-paragraph (c) codifies the doctrine of double-jeopardy.
Complimentarity aims to spur domestic justice 96 and recognizes the integrity of
sovereignty. However, in a more practical sense, complimentarity was a political
compromise during the Rome Treaty convention sought and obtained by state
parties who were concerned about undue encroachment of the sovereignty from an
overly-aggressive ICC. 197 This concern is a persistent criticism by opponents of
the ICC.1 98
The concern about sovereignty, raised in particular by opponents of the ICC,
whether warranted or not, is bound to be amplified by the recent trend of the use of
universal jurisdiction. Increasingly, domestic courts pursue criminal charges
against perpetrators of crimes occurring in foreign territories under the principal. 
199
Belgium, France, and Spain have all actively pursued criminal prosecutions based
on universal jurisdiction. 20 0 In these venues as well a customary law version of
complimentarity is emerging. In 2003, a case against President Alberto Fujimori
and other high-ranking Peruvian officials was initiated in the Spanish Supreme
195. Id. at art. 17(1).
196. Dickinson, Laura, Complementarity in Practice: Interactions Among Domestic, International,
and Transnational Human Rights Prosecutions, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law
and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, May 27, 2004, http://www.allacademic.
com/metalpl 17112_index.html
197. See Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and 'Modern' International Law: The
Principles of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1095, 1101
(2006).
198. See Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 2001.
199. Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001.
200. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back, 17 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 375, 375-76 (2004). In December 1999, Rigoberta Menchu Turn and others initiated a
criminal case in Spain as parties civiles against Guatemalan government officials including Effrain Rios
Montt. Id. at 378.
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Court under universal jurisdiction. 20 1 The Supreme Court, however, invoked a
version of complimentarity, termed the "effective jurisdiction test" in rejecting the
case on jurisdictional grounds.20 2 Under this test, Spain would defer to the
domestic court if the matter is the subject of kind domestic prosecution. 20' The
issue is currently relevant; a Spanish Court initiated proceedings against six former
high-level Bush administration officials for implementing the policy of torture.20 4
Under the Fujimori effective jurisdiction test, if the U.S. initiated an investigation
against these officials, Spain would defer to those proceedings.
To be sure, universal jurisdiction -not to mention the customary law version
of complimentarity - is in its infancy and remains a fluid concept. But it remains
nonetheless an issue that administrations like the Obama administration must
grapple with. Successor liability, by applying pressure on successor regimes to
look backward and initiate legitimate investigations, serves a useful role in
controlling jurisdiction domestically through complimentarity.
D. Successor liability would promote fact-finding
The current scheme of international law is designed to have the international
tribunals and the ICC prosecute perpetrators only at the highest levels of
culpability. At the first two modem tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, this was given
an expansive interpretation. The ICTY indicted nearly 165 suspects in its fifteen
years, 205 and the ICTR nearly eighty.206 This tribunal model, indicting a range of
suspects including high-, mid- and even low-level accused, proved to be costly and
slow, and it opened the tribunals up to criticism. 207 As a result, the subsequent
trend has been to limit the scope of indictees at the international tribunals to a
handful of high-level targets. Accordingly, the SCSL indicted only thirteen
suspects and the ECCC only five.20 8  The ICC to date has been even more
201. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 131 (2007).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Addington, who was the chief of staff and legal adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney. Marlise
Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Criminal Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES,
March 28, 2009, at A6.
205. See U.N. ICTY Key Figures of ICTY Cases, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/
KeyFigures (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
206. See U.N. ICTR Detainees - Status on 22 April 2009, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009).
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(Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2005_spr/wald.htm (reporting Wald as having
stated that "[t]he hybrid court is the likely wave of the future ... "We'll not ever see another court
modeled after the ICTY and ITCR. They've proven just too expensive, slow and bureaucratic." The two
courts together cost $250 million annually and have more than 2,000 employees.") (last visited Apr. 23,
2009).
208. Although there was an internal dispute within the Office of the Co-Prosecutors about whether
to indict six additional suspects. See Seth Mydans, Efforts to Limit Khmer Rouge Trials Decried, N.Y.
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selective, indicting only three suspects in their Sudan (Darfur) case, four suspects
in the Congo case, five in the Uganda case, and one suspect in their Central
African Republic case.2 °9
Under this trend, the tribunals leave prosecutions of all of the other suspects
in these cases, often numbering in the hundreds, to domestic systems (or other
domestic jurisdictions exercising universal jurisdiction). Those systems are better
equipped to investigate low-level indictees, but there are practical impediments to
mid-level targets.
By way of example, during the Viet Nam conflict the U.S. Army 1st Battalion
committed the now infamous My Lai massacre on March 16, 1968.210 The army
disciplined two persons but both were of a low military rank (captain) despite
evidence that orders came from higher up.2 11  There was also evidence that
suggested a subsequent cover-up of the incident had occurred at much higher
levels.212 In the Iraq war prison-abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. Army
court-martialed only one person, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordon, for a failure to
supervise subordinates and for his role in a subsequent cover-up.213 His lone
conviction - based only on the cover-up - was overturned by the commander of
the Military District of Washington.214
These cases illustrate that in practice, politics and power in the military and
political hierarchies often are inclined to punish comparatively low-level
perpetrators. Thus, there tends to be a gap between international tribunals and
domestic prosecutions. Kabura, for example, was first a Deputy Commander and
the Brigade Chief of Staff.215 His stature might well fall outside the scope of a new
tribunal as being not serious enough, and the connections of his rank may also
protect him from domestic accountability.
Successor liability applies pressure for every commander in the chain of
command to take legitimate measures to insure that every participant in criminal
acts is brought to justice. Moreover, to the extent that prosecutions have an
important fact-finding function, and successor liability facilitates prosecutions of
middle commanders, successor liability promotes a more comprehensive and
complete factual inquiry. The middle commanders often possess key information
about who plans and issues orders at the highest levels. Successor liability would
209. International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC?lan=en-GB.
210. Public Broadcasting Service, Vietnam Online: The My Lai Massacre, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/amex/vietnam/trenches/mylai.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
211. See My Lai: A Question of Orders, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan 25, 1971, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,904643-1,00.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
212. University of Missouri at Kansas City, General William R. Peers Report on the My Lai
Incident: A Summary, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/summaryrpt.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009).
213. Ben Nuckols, Military Prosecution in Abu Ghraib Scandal Ends, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan 11,
2008.
214. Id.
215. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended
Indictment, 2-6 (Jan. 11, 2002).
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
help to flush out information holders in order to piece together often complicated
theories of liability both during the criminal acts and in subsequent cover-ups.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. The attribution of the subordinates' crimes to the successor, rather than a
dereliction of duty offense, is a disproportionate result in the case of successors
who did share in the predecessor policies
If a court or tribunal prosecuted Obama criminally under successor liability,
the indictment would indicate he was charged with the underlying subordinates'
crimes, under the theory of criminal responsibility. For example, a hypothetical
indictment would charge Obama with responsibility for torture as a crime against
humanity, for the act of a military subordinate committed during the Bush
administration that continued to serve in the Obama administration. It may be little
solace to either Obama (and his supporters) or international criminal law that the
charge of torture is misleading in that Obama in actuality is only responsible for
his failure to carry out his duty as a superior to the torturer, not torture itself.
216
The problem illustrated in this example is the incongruity of the optics of the
law. Superior commander convictions at the tribunals do appear as though the
commander is convicted of the subordinates' crimes. 21 It is a subtle distinction
that may placate academics but few others. For Obama to be charged with alleged
Bush administration torture crimes would be unpalatable and would probably do
more harm than good. Successor liability applied to Gordon Brown would no
doubt occasion similar reactions. Of course, prosecutorial discretion could operate
to preclude instances of injustice that the valid application of laws may sometimes
produce. But successor liability does have the potential to produce this unpleasant
and arguably unjust result. As was said by the United States Military Commission
in Yamashita, "[i]t is absurd to consider a commander a murderer or rapist
because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape., 21 8 But the Obama
hypothetical demonstrates that this absurdity would appear to have occurred.
B. Successor liability would have a chilling effect on the U.S. military's ability to
change commanders
If a high-level commander learned that a subordinate battalion had been
committing crimes, he not only has a duty to punish but to prevent future crimes.
One option available to that commander would be to replace the immediate officer-
in-charge of the units committing the crimes. So, a four-star general upon leaming
that crimes against humanity had been committed in the theatre of war by a
particular battalion, may issue an order detaining the battalion commander,
typically a lieutenant colonel, for investigation along with an order replacing him
with a new lieutenant colonel. The impugned lieutenant colonel may inherit three
captains subordinated to him and the military hierarchies beneath those captains.
216. Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, 171 (Sept. 17, 2003).





Successor liability would mandate that the new lieutenant colonel, once he
learns of the criminal allegations previously committed by his predecessor and
subordinates, would have the duty to investigate and punish the offenders lest he
be held responsible himself. This creates a difficult scenario for a new commander
particularly in difficult command situations such as the theatre of war where the
esprit de corps would already be at issue.
Successor liability, in such situations, may induce a nominated replacement
commander to decline the command to avoid the liability inherent in the situation.
In the case of a renegade unit, the inability of high-level command to quickly
emplace new commanders to restore order and lawfulness could arguably facilitate
the continuation of criminality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hadiihasanovi6 and Oric decisions right now operate to keep successor
liability at bay. But those decisions rest on shaky ground and coupled with the
growing number of venues that are litigating superior responsibility, successor
liability could be revisited.
The call on President Obama to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
alleged crimes committed during the Bush presidency, and the myriad pressures
incumbent on him not to heed those calls, spotlights the relevance of successor
liability.
Successor liability can lead to uncomfortable and perhaps damaging results in
the case of a superior who opposed the criminal behavior of his predecessor. What
if President Obama was held legally responsible for the policy of torture
effectuated by the Bush administration that he opposed? What if Nelson Mandela
had been charged with crimes of apartheid for failing to punish known offenders?
One can scarcely imagine the fallout from that.
But at the same time, history is replete with examples of mass crimes going
unpunished because there is no interest in the successor regimes dredging up the
past or because immunity has been implicitly or explicitly traded for political gain.
Moreover, there has been no mechanism by which political outsiders could bring
pressure to bear on the powerful.
In the end, the international community must wrestle with whether pressuring
successor regimes to address the crimes committed by their predecessors is a
fundamentally fair trade-off for ending impunity.
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